California State University, San Bernardino

CSUSB ScholarWorks
Theses Digitization Project

John M. Pfau Library

1994

Alternative dispute resolution and public policy conflict:
Preemptive dispute resolution negotiated rulemaking
Allen G. Norman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project
Part of the Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Norman, Allen G., "Alternative dispute resolution and public policy conflict: Preemptive dispute resolution
negotiated rulemaking" (1994). Theses Digitization Project. 928.
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/928

This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND PUBUC POUCY CONFLICT:
PREEMPTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING

A Project
Presented to the

Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Public Administration

hy
Allen G. Norman

December 1994

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND PUBUC POUCY CONFUCT:
PREEMPTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING

A Project
Presented to the

Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino

by
Allen G. Norman

December 1994

Approved by:

Dr. Bri^n Watts

Date

Chair,Public Administration.

. Dav

oun

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

1

Chapter 2 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

3

Mediation

5

Arbitration

6

Negotiation

6

Preemptive Dispute Resolution

7

Chapters NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Figure 1

9
18

Chapter 4 ADMINISTRATIVE APPUCATION

20

Chapter 5

APPLICATION

22

Application to Local Government

28

CONCLUSION

32

Chapter 6
Footnotes

35

Bibliography

37

111

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND PUBUC POUCY CONFUCT:
PREEMPTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Alternative Dispute Resolution(ADR)has become the rage among people
and groups interested in litigation reform. The cost of litigation has become
too high in every avenue of society, from the federal government to disputes
among neighbors.
BCimberlee K.Kovach notes.

In a majority of cases,the parties begin with a recognition
that a problem,disagreement or dispute exists. If an
immediate answer or resolution is not attained, the

conflict escalates. In fact,the path of conflict has been likened
to a snowball rolling downhill. The size as well as the
intensity increases. If stopped early,the growth is halted.
That has been the goal of much of the current ADR
movement.

ADR techniques have been implemented in the federal government as
well as in corporate America. A recent corporate survey in The Dispute
Resolution Times foimd that the main reasons corporations chose ADR over

litigation are to reduce costs and save time.^
This project will briefly define and discuss Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR)as a precursor to Preemptive Dispute Resolution. It will then
examine Preemptive Dispute Resolution and, more specifically. Negotiated

Rulemaking as means of resolving differences before litigation becomes

necessary. Finally, it will discuss how Negotiated Rulemaking could be
improved and expanded to the benefit of local and mimicipal governments.

CHAPTER 2

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a group of processes through
which disputes, conflicts and cases are resolved outside of formal judicial and
administrative adjudication. These processes include negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, case evaluation techniques and private judging.
The need for alternative dispute resolution was born out of a litigation

reform movement. Corporations, private parties, and governments all
needed a better method of resolving disputes in a timely and cost effective
manner; hence ADR was offered as a viable solution to a societal need. ADR

can provide many advantages over litigation: speed, lower costs,
confidentiality, simplicity, flexibility and preservation of business
relationships.

ADR techniques provide a faster resolution of a dispute when compared

to litigation. A civil case may take up to seven years to reach a final verdict
and longer if appealed, giving truth to the cliche, "Justice delayed is justice
denied." In contrast, arbitration may take anywhere from one month to eight
months from hearing to award. This time savings converts into a significant
cost savings; less time that is taken, the lower are the billable hours charged

by attorneys, the less is the administrative overhead, and the

greater is the present value of the amount recovered by successful parties.
3

Another feature of ADR is that proceedings may be held on a confidential

basis.

The parties involved may avoid the adverse publicity of an

embarrassing dispute as information relating to an ADR process is not open
to the public record.

ADR is less formal than litigation. Discovery may be limited or excluded

altogether. Rigid rules of evidence do not apply. Finally, ADR is more

flexible procedurally than are the rules of civil procedure. The judicial system
is structured to impose traditional remedies whereas the ADR process does
not have to abide by precedent and has more freedom to award
unconventional settlements.

ADR also assists in the preservation of business relationships. Litigation is
structured to be adversarial. Richard H. Weise, senior vice-president and

general counsel of Motorola,Inc. in a recent interview in The Corporate Legal
Times stated that.

The real costs of disputes is the disruption of valuable
relationships. And since most of our litigation is with
customers, suppliers,employees and the government, what
more important relationships are there? There is tremendous
cost during long,protracted litigations because of the

impleasantness created and the bile stirred up between

you and those with whom you have a relationship. ^

On the whole, ADR offers methods of dispute resolution that run the

gamut in their levels of confrontation. Obviously,formal litigation would be

the most confrontational process. The level of adversarial confrontation
decreases as you move from arbitration to mediation to negotiation.

MEDIATION

The most widely used and flexible form of non-binding ADR is mediation.
Mediation allows both parties to maintain their positions while the

mediation process guides the parties down a path that hopefully leads to
settlement.

More succinctly, mediation is the process where a third-party neutral acts
as facilitator in resolving a dispute between two or more parties. It is nonadversarial in nature as the parties communicate directly. The role of the
mediator is to facilitate communication between the parties, assist them in

focusing on real issues of the dispute, and generate options for achieving a
settlement. The goal of mediation is that the parties themselves arrive at a
mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute.
Overall, mediation creates an environment where a settlement can be

achieved that is mutually satisfactory to both parties without having to

undergo the cost or aggravation of more confrontational methods.

ARBITRATION

Arbitration involves one or more neutral parties (an individual or panel)
who listens to both sides of a dispute and then renders an award. Arbitration

can be binding or non-binding. In binding arbitration, the decision of the
arbitrator(s) is final. However,the parties to the arbitration can file a petition
with the court to confirm, correct or vacate an award in accordance with law.

In non-binding arbitration, if the decision of the arbitrator is unsatisfactory to
the parties,they may elect to go to court.

Arbitration is more formal procedurally than mediation and therefore
more confrontational. The costs of the proceeding are higher when compared
to mediation as is the level of aggravation.

NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is at the heart of all settlements. It can occur during any phase
of the litigation - arbitration - mediation spectrum. The other ADR processes
are different in that they generally require the intervention of one or more

third parties. On the other hand, negotiation involves only the parties to the

dispute and,if represented, their lawyers. Legal negotiations may take place
informally between lawyers for both parties as they discuss different aspects of
the case. Formal negotiations may take place when there is a real desire to

settle the matter. However, often direct negotiations do not result in a

satisfactory settlement. When this occurs,it is time to bring in the third party
neutral for assistance.

PREEMPTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

While Alternative Dispute Resolution provides an alternative to litigation

in solving disputes. Preemptive Dispute Resolution (FDR)seeks to iron out
disagreements prior to any dispute arising. It seeks, that is, to preempt

litigation, arbitration and mediation. Methods such as negotiations, mediated
negotiations and negotiated rulemaking fall into the preemptive category.
Each method is an attempt at consensus building.

Any form of negotiation, buyer-seller or labor-management for example,is
a consensus building process. If the parties fail to reach an agreement then no

joint conclusion is achieved. When these negotiations fail to reach a
consensus,the parties turn to other processes. Labor may have a strike,a
buyer may turn to another seller or the parties may submit their differences to
an adjudicatory body. Through the use of these preemptive processes,
litigation becomes less necessary.

Discussing conflict between the oil and fishing industries, Gerald W.
Cormick and Alana Knaster note:

Mediated negotiations and similar processes have
7

increasingly been used during the past decade to resolve
a variety of disputes over such public policy issues as the
use and allocation of natural resources. Mediation has

thus evolved from being an interesting experiment to

being a widely accepted public policy option.^
The greatest current expansion in the use of mediated negotiations is in
the development of consensus regulations, where parties in conflict are
brought together to hammer out regulations that all parties find acceptable.
This process has come to be known as negotiated rulemaking.

8

CHAPTER 3

NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING

The concept of negotiating regulations was originated and developed by
Philip Harter. In his 1982 article, "Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the
Malaise, " Harter outlined his concept of negotiated rulemaking in the

regulatory process. He argued that the federal government was spending a
great deal of time and money in litigation over disputed regulations. Harter

proposed including all interested parties in the rulemaking procedure to
stave off later disputes—to preempt them. He concluded that by including

potentially affected people in the process, most disagreements and concerns
could be put out in the open and resolved prior to the rules going into effect

rather than after the rules were already in place.^ As a result of his work,the
federal government and state agencies began to adopt this concept.
The obvious advantage of this method is its potential to head off potential

litigation by having affected parties meet and negotiate before the rules go
into effect. Negotiated Rulemaking gives each side a forum for discussing
concerns in a non-adversarial manner. To the extent that it offers

an opportimity to avoid expensive litigation, it must be viewed as offering a
"win-win" opportunity for all affected parties, including government.

THE NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT OF 1990

The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 was passed as an amendment to
the Administrative Procedure Act. The 101st Congress cited six reasons as to
why this Act was necessary.

(1) Government regulation has increased substantially since the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act.

(2) Agencies currently use rulemaking procedures that may
discourage the affected parties from meeting and
communicating with each other,and may cause parties with
different interests to assume conflicting and antagonistic

positions and to engage in expensive and time-consuming
litigation over agency rules.
(3) Adversarial rulemaking deprives the affected parties and the
public of the benefits of face-to-face negotiations and
cooperation in developing and reaching agreement on a
rule. It also deprives them of the benefits of shared
information,knowledge,expertise and technical abilities
possessed by the affected parties.

(4) Negotiated rulemaking,in which the parties who will be
significantly affected by a rule participate in the development
of the rule,can provide significant advantages over
adversarial rulemaking.

(5) Negotiated rulemaking can increase the acceptability and
improve the substance of rules,making it less likely that the
affected parties will resist enforcement or challenge such
rules in court. It may also shorten the amoimt of time
needed to issue final rules.

(6) Agencies have the authority to establish negotiated
rulemaking committees under the laws establishing such
agencies and their activities and under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act(5 U.S.C. App.) Several agencies have
10

successfully used negotiated rulemaking. The process has
not been widely used by other agencies,however,in part
because such agencies are unfamiliar with the process or

imcertain as to the authority for such rulemaking.^

As the "Findings" indicate. Congress realized that the rulemaking process

had become unacceptable. In many cases,the process created an adversarial
environment that encouraged litigation. Additionally,it was recognized that

often in the rulemaking process experts were not always consulted. Finally,
it was noted that if all affected parties feel that they have a stake in the

making of a rule,they will be less likely to find it unacceptable and feel the
need to litigate.

The Negotiated Rulemaking Act outlined specifically the procedures
agencies using negotiated rulemaking must use.

First, the agency head must determine if negotiated rulemaking is in the

public interest. The Act sets forth that the agency head shall consider:
*

Whether there is a need for a rule;

*

If there is a limited number of identifiable interests

that will be significantly affected by the rule;
*

If there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee can

be convened with a balanced representation of persons

who can adequately represent the interests and are willing
to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on the
proposed rule;
11

*

If there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee will

reach a consensus on the proposed rule within a fixed
period of time;
*

That the negotiated rulemaking procedure will not

unreasonably delay the notice of proposed rulemaking
and the issuance of the final rule;

*

That the agency has adequate resources and is willing to
commit such resources,including technical assistance to
the committee;

*

The agency,to the maximum extent possible consistent
with die legal obligations of the agency,will use the
consensus of the committee with respect to the proposed
rules as the basis for the rule proposed by the agency for

notice and comment. ^
ICnaster and Harter discuss the Environmental Protection Agency's(EPA)

decision to utilize negotiated rulemaking in their regulatory procedure.

The debates over passage of the legislation had been
contentious, and it was felt that developing the

regulations would be equally controversial. William
Rosenberg, EPA's Assistant Administrator for Air
Programs,decided to consider using regulatory
negotiation to develop the rules. Even though
negotiation would be time consuming and would
preclude staff from beginning drafting immediately,
Rosenberg determined that the process would provide
EPA with expertise,experience,and practical insight of
these parties in sorting through the complex issues. And,
at least as important,it would develop a consensus on the
rules.
O

Final consensus is paramount when developing regulations. Displeased
parties can block actions with court proceedings and tie up the proceedings
12

for years. Negotiated Rulemaking seeks to make all parties happy and stave
off imwanted and costly litigation.

Fortunately,by implementing this process,the rules were developed close
to schedule and met the ambitious goals of the Clean Air Act Amendment of
1990. It is very likely that without negotiated regulations,these goals would
have never been met,or at least delayed.

The next section of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 discusses the
role of a convener. A convener is a person who impartially assists an agency

in determining whether establishment of a rulemaking committee is feasible
and appropriate in a specific rulemaking case. It is the job of the convener to
identify persons who will be affected by the proposed rule and conduct
discussions with them to determine if the formation of a committee is viable.

It is the duty of a convener to report his/her findings to the agency. The
agency can then request that the convener furnish the agency with the names
of people who would be willing and qualified to represent the interests that
will be affected by the proposed rule. The convener's report can be made
available to the public upon request.
In the case of the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, the EPA chose

Knaster and Harter, pioneers in the field of ADR and negotiated rulemaking,
to act as conveners. The EPA decided to assign one convener to the
13

oxygenated fuels nile and the other to the reformulated gasoline rule.

Some parties were interested in both rules, so Knaster and Harter tried to
coordinate their efforts as much as possible. They began the process by
conducting extensive interviews with the EPA's Office of Mobile Sources.
This office had potential sources for the conveners to contact. The conveners
discussed the regulatory process with each potential participant and were
mainly concerned that the negotiations take place in the limited time the EPA

was allotting; three months.

The conveners also did not want the

negotiations to reopen issues that had been debated and resolved during the
legislative process. It would be the responsibility of the neutral facilitators
and the participants themselves to keep the talks productive. The conveners
main task was to keep a manageable number of direct participants since they
knew they could never hope to get representatives of all affected interests
around the same table.

According to the Act,after the convener's assessment,if the agency decides
to go forward with the formation of a committee, the agency must publish in
the Federal Register and/or other appropriate trade publications a notice
which must include:

an announcement that the agency intends to establish
a negotiated rulemaking committee to negotiate and
develop a proposed rule;
a description of the subject and scope of the rule to be
developed and the issues to be considered;
14

a list of the interests which are likely to be significantly
affected by the rule;

a list of the persons proposed to represent such interests
and the person or persons proposed to represent the
agency;

a proposed agenda and schedule for completing the work
of the committee,including a target date for publication by
the agency of a proposed rule for notice and comment;

a description of administrative support for the committee
to be provided by the agency,including technical
assistance;

a solicitation for comments on the proposal to establish
the committee and the proposed membership of the
negotiated rulemaking committee; and
an explanation of how a person may apply or nominate
another person for membership on the committee.

After publication of notice, the agency makes a final determination as to
whether to form the committee. It bases its decision on the applications made

for membership to the committee and comments submitted. If the agency
determines it will form a committee, it must then comply with the Federal

Advisory Committee Act. If the agency should decide not to form a
committee, it must then publish a notice of this decision and the reasons for
the decision in the Federal Register and/or trade publications.

Should an agency go forward with forming a committee,it is bound by the

Negotiated Rulemaking Act to limit the number of members on the
committee to twenty-five. However, if the agency head determines that a

greater number of members is necessary to achieve balance, then more than
15

twenty-five members may be appointed. In addition,there must be at least
one person on the committee representing the agency.
In the case of The Clean Fuels Regulatory negotiation, the conveners

recommended that approximately twenty-five members sit on the committee.
However, the parties involved insisted that the number of seats on the
committee be expanded so that all the key sub-interests within each major
organization were represented.
Harter and Knaster state in their article.

The diversity among members in several key interest groups
became an important consideration in the final design of the
clean fuels negotiation process. For example,the petroleum
refiners had two trade associations,one representing a broad
spectrum of the industry including numerous small refiners and
the other representing major refiners. Differences in market
share,geography,and organization structure between the large
and small refiners necessitated that both associations be seated at

the table. Representation was complicated further by the
diversity among the major refiners, ranging from
significant differences in the composition of the crude oil they
used to a wide variety of investment strategies that affected
companies' position on the content of the regulation.
Moreover, several of the major companies were further along
in their product reformulations in response to changing
stringent regulations.

Due to the complexity of this negotiation process, it was necessary to

expand the committee to thirty-one members in order to include all interests

that needed to be represented. The conveners proposed that the EPA establish
an "Umbrella" committee that would be responsible for establishing
16

consensus on the whole package. In addition, there would be work groups

formed around the specific interests that would make recommendations to
the umbrella committee for final consideration.(Figure 1)

The Act addresses the question of expenses for committee members and
states that members will be reimbursed for travel, etc. only if there is a

financial need that would otherwise preclude them from membership on the
committee. The Act is also quick to point out that any funds received as a

result of membership on a negotiated rulemaking committee does not

constitute employment in the Federal Government. The remainder of the
Act addresses compilation of the data and judicial review. In reference to
compilation of data,the Act makes three points:
The Administrative Conference of the United States shall

compile and maintain data related to negotiated
rulemaking and shall act as a clearinghouse to assist
agencies and parties participating in negotiated
rulemaking proceedings.

Each agency engaged in negotiated rulemaking shall
provide to the Administrative Conference of the United
States a copy of any reports submitted to the agency by
negotiated rulemaking committees under section 586 and
such additional information as necessary to enable the
Administrative Conference of the United States to comply
with this subsection.

The Administrative Conference of the United States shall

review and analyze the reports and information received
under this subsection and shall transmit a biennial report
to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate

and the appropriate committees of the House of
Representatives.
17
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Finally, the Act requires that any agency action relating to establishing,
assisting or terminating a negotiated rulemaking committee is not subject to

judicial review; however, nothing in the Act shall bar judicial review of a
final rule if judicial review is provided by law.

President George Bush stated on the signing of the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act of 1990:

This Act will encourage Federal agencies to use

negotiation in the regulatory process,to the extent that it
may be appropriate,as a means of avoiding costly and
time-consuming litigation.

Although the process of negotiated rulemaking can seem time-consuming,
on the whole when compared to protracted litigation the time and money

invested is a fraction. The Congress and the President both viewed this Act as

a necessary component and guide on the road to litigation reform.

19

CHAPTER 4

ADMINISTRATIVE APPLICATION

The immediate administrative impact after the passage of the Act was

important to some agencies and business as usual to others. For example,the
EPA and the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health
Administration had been utilizing negotiated rulemaking since the early

'80's. These departments were quite familiar with the procedure and its
benefits. Marshall J. Breger, Solicitor of Labor, in his introduction to the
Department of Labor's Negotiated Rulemaking Handbook notes.
Those seeking to leam about DOL negotiated rulemaking
activities for the first time may take the bulk of this
Handbook as a sign that the process is so complex that it
is not worth pursuing. Such a conclusion would seriously
misconstrue the reg-neg process and the purpose of
this Handbook.

The main hesitation of many agencies came out of their unfamiliarity with

the process. As is true with all forms of ADR,unfamiliarity breeds suspicion.
The task of each agency was to train its personnel in the negotiated
rulemaking process. Most agencies, as the Department of Labor, developed
highly detailed handbooks to address specific concerns and step-by-step
procedures for the given agency.
20

The Act allotted for a great deal of discretion to each agency head. First,the

agency head decides whether or not to form a committee. Even if a
committee is formed and rules are proposed, the agency is not required to

adopt the consensus reached by the committee. Therefore, the fear of too
many people running the process is unfounded. Some autonomy is still in
place.

Obviously,the agency has an agenda it is trying to meet. As with the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, certain deadlines were in place that had to be

met by the EPA. As stated previously, the EPA's Assistant Administrator for
Air programs considered the costs and the time frame in deciding whether to
utilize the negotiated rulemaking procedure in relations to this Act. Agency
administrators though uncomfortable with a new procedure are willing to try

it if it helps them meet their goals in a more stream-lined and cost effective
manner.

21

CHAPTER 5
APPLICATION

In a more analytical Icxsk at negotiated rulemaking,one might ask what is
the true definition? In the House Report on Public Law 101-648, Negotiated
Rulemaking is defined as when.

"representatives of all affected parties,including the
agency,come together in an effort to draft a proposed rule
that takes into account the needs of the various interests,

as well as the requirements of the underlying statute.

To discover a more simplistic definition, one must break the word into its

component parts. "Rulemaking" is much easier to define. It simply is the
process of making or setting down a set of rules. "Negotiated" or
"Negotiation" are a bit more complex to define.
Alana S. Knaster in her paper entitled,"How to Negotiate, A Guide for

Participating in Multi-Party Public Policy Negotiations", defines negotiation
as,

"The art of reaching compromise. It requires give and
take on the issues under discussions."
15

Knaster believes people would have an easier time in the negotiating

process if they would view it as an everyday process. Negotiation is in fact a
part of our everyday lives. We negotiate food choices,entertainment choices
22

and the like with family members and friends on a regular basis. The same
skills we use to negotiate with those closest to us are the skills needed at the

formal negotiation procedure. Knaster contends that if participants would
view negotiations as an everyday skill then this would help decrease the
apprehension about participating in the process.

In the final analysis, negotiated rulemaking is a process by which

participants utilize compromise and consensus building to formulate rules.
The rules can be of the regulatory nature, as with the EPA's rulemaking, or

they could be rules of imderstanding between two mxmidpal entities.
In August of 1991,the commtmity of Westchester, California, and Loyola
Marymount University entered a negotiated rulemaking process in order to
reach an agreement on the Leavey Campus Development and to address
community and University concerns and needs. Both parties felt this
consensus building process was a productive way to hash out differences and
concerns over this new project.

As previously discussed, ADR in general and negotiated rulemaking more

specifically,is a way to preserve relationships. Both the commimity of
Westchester and Loyola Marymount had a much larger stake in preserving
their relationship than in proving a point through litigation.

Westchester wanted Loyola to address the construction impact,the phasing

of the project, traffic and parking issues, and the aesthetics of the project and
its community compatibility. Loyola was interested in addressing these issues
23

as the community of Westchester had a hurdle of permits for Loyola to get
through. Without the help of Westchester, the permit process could have
been an impossible task.

In asking the question "why use negotiated rulemaking?", the
Westchester-Loyola procedure offers a good example. If these two parties had
not entered into this process,Loyola would have gone ahead with its building

program. However,it would have been akin to shooting arrows in the dark.
If Loyola did not know Westchester's concerns before hand,the project could
have been stalled for years. For example,the community of Westchester files
a lawsuit over traffic and parking issues, blocking construction. Not only

does the community of Westchester have to pay for this litigation, Loyola's
project is put on hold and they would also have to finance a costly litigation
procedure. In addition, the adversarial nature of this conflict would have
caused bad feelings between the two parties and both sides might vow to not

be cooperative. Hypothetically,this situation can go from bad to worse to an
all out war.

In any given situation,it is prudent to know where your opposition stands,
whether it is in politics, sports or business. In the past, government entities
have acted like "a bull in a china shop" and crammed regulations, projects,

etc. down the throat of the public. Many times the public is enraged simply
because they were not involved in the process.

24

Gerald W.Cormick notes.

In developing a forum for the settlement of economic/
environmental conflicts, unanimity or, conversely,

granting a "veto" to each participant has important
benefits. The "veto" levels the playing field. For a
defined period of time on the issues that the participants
have agreed to address,they participate as equals.

This veto power tends to create an atmosphere where each participant has a
concern and self-interest in crafting a solution that meets the needs of the

other participating interests.

This teamwork approach creates an

environment where agreements can be reached, money can be saved and
amicable relations preserved.
In the mid-80's a conflict arose between the oil industry and the

indigenous commercial fishermen who fished off the central coast of
California. The fishermen believed the oil industry was interfering with

their fishing activities and conversely, the oil industry felt the fishermen
were interfering with their oil exploration work.

Specifically, the oil industry was contracting with operators of seismic

testing vessels to map undersea structures and were paying charter fees that
exceeded $35,000 a day. The acoustic exploration process requires that boats
follow grid patterns in order to provide a predetermined sequence of data for
analysis. Consequently, the captain of a seismic vessel would often find
himself on a course that intersected the course of a fishing boat. The

25

fisherman, who was trailing hundreds of yards of gear had either to pull in

his gear and face a substantial loss of fishing time or hope that the seismic
vessel would alter its course. If the vessel did not alter its course, the

fisherman would lose his gear as well as fishing time.

The seismic captain faced a similar dilemma. He could change his course
and face the possibility of nullifying the day's exploration and losing his
charter fee or hope the fisherman would move. If the fisherman did not

move and his gear was damaged,the seismic captain would face protracted

litigation over the gear damage. Additionally, the fisherman believed that
this seismic testing interfered with the fish by dispersing schools and
damaging eggs and larvae.

Both parties brought their conflicts before the California Coastal
Commission and the State Lands Commission,but to no avail. Finally, one

of the industries asked The Mediation Institute to chair a public meeting over

the conflict and from that meeting negotiated mediation between the two
industries was made possible.

Although the negotiation process took months,it did alleviate the tension
between the two groups and put them on the road to consensus-building. In
this case, the negotiation process saved millions of dollars that would have
been spent on potential lawsuits and loss of business.
In most cases it is impossible to predict how much money could be spent to

litigiously resolve conflicts that are dealt with in the negotiated rulemaking
26

process. However,one has to only look at the time frame for resolving these
conflicts to see the potential cost/benefit ratio. A negotiated rulemaking

procedure takes three months to one year to resolve a problem whereas
litigation can take upwards of ten years to reach a final decision. It does not
take a mathematician to compute the astronomical amount of money that
can be saved utilizing this process.

Some of the pitfalls of negotiated rulemaking center around the
bureaucracy in which governmental procedure is mired. Agency heads are

given a great deal of discretion as to whether to implement the process or
even accept the rules once they are agreed upon. Hypothetically, the entire

negotiated rulemaking procedure could be completed and then the agency
head could decide to go in a different direction. That is not very likely, as
time constraints and agendas must be met,but it is legally possible.
The amount of time the convener must take to locate participants for the

committee seems disproportional. So much emphasis is placed on finding

the perfect people and groups to represent every interest that the process can
be stretched too far and among too many groups. There needs to be a balance

between having enough groups represented and not having every

microscopic interest included. Without enough groups represented, the

preemptive purpose of negotiated rulemaking would be defeated. If one or
more groups are disenchanted and propose to litigate, the agency would still
be caught in a litigation war it was trying to avoid.
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APPUCATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The implementation of negotiated rulemaking among local and municipal

governments is an idea whose time has come. Since negotiation is the art of
the possible, what better way to serve the needs of a dty or county.
The "idea" of the negotiated rulemaking process can be extracted without

having to get bogged down in all the procedural rules. The concept of a
committee representing the interests of the population (the dty,
county or state population) over an issue to build consensus is a useful one.
Conflicts exist at every level of government; between cities, between dties

and the coimty,between cities and the state, and between cities and the federal
government. Additionally, conflicts arise between all levels of government
and the private sector,(i.e. vendors)

In the Coachella Valley recently, the Valley cities were competing in a bid
for a Metrolink station. The contract was being awarded by the State. In this

instance, more progress could have been made if the cities had worked

together to decide where the best place in the Valley to build the station was
instead of only looking out for each individual interest.

Each city individually was concerned about the effect on their sales tax
revenues and their transient occupancy tax (TOT). However, the entire

Coachella Valley would benefit economically from such a station. To date,
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no litigation is pending, however feelings are hurt and tempers are high and
all could have been avoided utilizing the negotiated rulemaking process.

There are several barriers to implementing the negotiated rulemaking

process in the Coachella Valley. First, every city competes very hard for tax
dollars generated from the tourism industry. For example. Palm Springs is
not interested in promoting a Metrolink station in Palm Desert as it is seen as

potentially taking tax dollars away from Palm Springs. Naturally,the City of
Palm Springs wants the station built in Palm Springs.
Another barrier to consensus among the Valley Cities is class conflict. The
economic picture of Coachella Valley residents is quite diverse. In Indian
Wells, the average per capita income is over $30,000 a year. In contrast,

Coachella, which has a high migrant farm worker population, has an average

per capita income of under $5,000 a year. There is also a sharp contrast when
comparing Cathedral City to Rancho Mirage or Palm Springs. This income
gap between cities creates cities that have quite different agendas.
Consequently, achieving consensus over any issue, including the Metrolink
station, is difficult.

Ironically, Valley cities have shown consensus over the attempt to exclude

a locally impopular land use. No Valley dty wants a landfill in its backyard.
The Coachella Valley is involved in a dispute over the location of a
landfill site in Eagle Mountain. The Riverside County Board of Supervisors
held public forums over the issues but no committee was formed that truly
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represented the concerns of the residents. The Supervisors were not only
concerned with generating revenue for their county, but padding their

political war chests with contributions from Mine Reclamation, Corp., the
company proposing to build the landfill,

Already litigation has begim over

the issue,even though Mine Reclamation, Corp. has not begxm the project. A

simplified version of a negotiated rulemaking committee with members

from the public at large as well as Mine Reclamation,Corp. would have been
beneficial to the process. As the project is still in the governmental approval
stage,the jury is still out on the outcome of this conflict.
In a broader application, the City of Palm Springs recently formed a
Human Rights Commission to address discrimination conflicts occurring in

the City of Palm Springs. The committee appointees show broad community
representation.

This Commission is trying to resolve discrimination

problems before they are taken to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission(EEOC)or dragged through civil court. The Commission is also

charged with setting up guidelines for anti-discrimination policies to be
utilized throughout the dty.

An area in municipal government that could benefit from the utilization

of the negotiated rulemaking process is in the awarding of contracts. The
negotiated rulemaking process offers a forum for developing the rules and
procedures a city or county needs in determining the awarding of contracts.

This process would also include vendors as well as city or county employees
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on the negotiating committee. Both sides would have the opportunity to air
conflicts and concerns and correct problems before the need for litigation
arises.

On the whole,local and municipal governments implementing mediated

negotiations can realize not only cost benefits but can create a happier
constituency by making them feel a part of the process.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Voltaire said.

"I was never mined but twice: Once when I lost a lawsuit;
once when I won one."

Voltaire's skepticism regarding litigation has been shared in recent years by
an increasing number of parties who have experienced first-hand the trauma
of the traditional adversarial system. Most people engaged in a conflict are
looking for other dispute resolution methods that are cheaper, more
efficient,less confrontational and that also hold out at least the promise of

resolving disputes without irreparable injury to the parties' underlying
relationship.

This project set out to define and discuss Alternative Dispute Resolution as

a precursor to Preemptive Dispute Resolution and then take a closer look at
Negotiated Rulemaking as a means of resolving conflict before litigation
became necessary.

Implementing and utilizing the Negotiated Rulemaking process offers
several advantages. First, it gives each side a forum for discussing concerns in
a non-adversarial,less confrontational manner. Through this process,

consensus is the goal and therefore it becomes a "win-win" proposition for all
involved instead of creating winners and losers.
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The second advantage to utilizing Negotiated Rulemaking is derived from
the first. Negotiated Rulemaking by creating this "win-win" environment

heads off potential litigation and consequently potentially astronomical legal
bills. Parties are less likely to become litigious when they have a stake in the

rule-making process. In addition to saving money,staving off litigation also
assists in implementing the rule faster.

Finally, Negotiated Rulemaking helps preserve amicable relationships.

Negotiated Rulemaking is preemptive in nature and creates a forum to
resolve conflicts before they necessitate a confrontation. Discussing rationally

concerns between parties creates empathy. More confrontational methods

(i.e. litigation) destroy empathy and are destructive to relationships,(business
or otherwise)

This project also set out to see how Negotiated Rulemaking could be

improved and expanded to benefit local and mimidpal governments. In the
Coachella Valley, ADR techniques are being implemented in several areas but

the process is still in its infancy. Utilizing Negotiated Rulemaking in the
process of awarding contracts was seen to be a beneficial expansion of the
process. Realistically, any governmental process whether it be questions of
administration, procedure,etc. would benefit from this consensus building
process.

Consensus is the building block of resolving disputes in a non-adversarial
maimer and is at the heart of the negotiated rulemaking process. In the
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advent of the wave of litigation reform,it just makes good sense to revert to
methods that solve problems and not simply create winners and losers.
Without the label of "winner" or "loser" all parties are more apt to work as a
team.

Teamwork,whether in the federal regulatory process or at work in

municipal governments creates an environment where things can actually be
accomplished. Bureaucracy has created a system where it is impossible to

achieve anything. Negotiation has created a process where it is possible to
achieve everything.
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